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


23 September 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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23 September 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. USSR - Communist China: Comment on Soviet statement of 20-21 September. (Page 1)
2. South Vietnam: Vu Van Mau expects Nhu to succeed Diem. (Page 3)

25X1

4. Cuba: Castro believes he is succeeding in curtail-
ing orthodox Communists. (Page 6)
5. Czechoslovakia: Novotny gives way to liberaliza-
tion pressures and shakes up government.
(Page 7)
6. Notes: Argentina; Brazil. (Page 8)

25X1

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 September 1963

DAILY BRIEF

USSR - Communist China: The Soviet statement of 20 and 21 September reflects the Soviet leaders' confidence that Peiping's refusal to sign the nuclear test ban treaty has provided them with a potent weapon in their drive to discredit and isolate the Chinese Communists.

The statement claimed that the Chinese leaders have sustained a "serious moral and political defeat" and that their rejection of the treaty "amounts to complete apostasy" from the world Communist line. Moscow is portraying the Chinese leaders as bloodthirsty warmongers who are ready to embark on irresponsible adventures to advance their national aims. The statement warned that Peiping's desire to acquire nuclear weapons causes "serious doubts concerning the aims of the foreign policy of the CPR leaders."

The statement replied to recent Chinese charges of Soviet subversive activities in China by claiming that Chinese "servicemen and civilians" have "systematically violated" the Soviet frontier since 1960. The USSR for the first time took notice of Peiping's declared intention to revise or abrogate "unjust" territorial settlements imposed on China by the "imperialists." The Russians warned the Chinese that the "artificial creation" of territorial disputes would mean "embarking on a very dangerous path" and strongly implied that Moscow will refuse to recognize Peiping's claims.

Moscow's pronouncement concluded with a pro forma appeal for a cessation of polemics, but also with a thinly veiled threat of unspecified Soviet retaliatory actions if Peiping persists in attacking the USSR. It warned that the Chinese "must clearly realize that the most resolute rebuff from the CPSU and the Soviet people awaits them on this road."

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*South Vietnam: (Former Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau, now in Paris, considers that Nhu is in de facto control in Saigon and is being groomed as Diem's successor.)

(Mau claims to have evidence that Nhu is in contact with "the Viet Minh," but believes his basic purpose is to blackmail the US to prevent termination of aid. Mau feels that, while Nhu is not above thinking he can make a valid deal with North Vietnam, he is using French overtures for his own purposes.)

(Mau feels that de Gaulle has reached the "erroneous conclusion" that France can preserve its influence in its former colonies if they are made neutral states.)

25X1

(In Saigon, the situation remains quiet. There has been little observable government activity in connection with the National Assembly election next Friday, although the campaign period began 17 September.)

(The US Embassy notes a recent improvement in the attitudes of working-level Vietnamese toward their American military and civilian counterparts, suggesting that Vietnamese leaders have eased controls on such contacts.)

(However, articles critical of the US are appearing in the controlled vernacular press, and briefings prepared for Vietnamese troops are said to contain an anti-American slant.)

25X1

25X1

23 Sept 63

DAILY BRIEF

3

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007200400001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007200400001-7

Cuba: (Fidel Castro believes he is successfully curtailing the influence and power of the orthodox Communists as he proceeds with the development of his own form of Communism.)

(Available evidence suggests that mutually agreed upon Cuban-Soviet plans call for the maintenance in Cuba for some time of a cadre of Soviet military advisers and technicians. It will be some months before the SAM system can come under effective Cuban operation.)

23 Sept 63

DAILY BRIEF

6

Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovak party leader and President Novotny is giving way to the numerous pressures for political liberalization and more practical economic policies.

On 21 September a shake-up of the top level of the party and government was announced. Novotny dismissed or reassigned six high-level officials closely identified either with the regime's past political repressions or present economic problems. They have been replaced by representatives of a new and somewhat more liberal generation in the Czechoslovak party. The new ministers will deal with domestic economic affairs, education, and cultural matters.

Novotny's action may encourage demands for even more sweeping changes, including his own ouster. Three of the appointees probably are members of a more liberal grouping in the central committee hostile to Novotny.

25X1



23 Sept 63

DAILY BRIEF

7

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NOTES

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Argentina: Argentine Army leaders have been expressing their concern lest the slow pace of negotiations for a mutual assistance pact with the US result in the pact's being blocked. They assert that if the agreement is delayed until after the Illia government takes office on 12 October, ardent nationalistic elements in Congress would be unlikely to approve it in open debate. The US Embassy states that the US may lose much prestige in Argentina if US aid is not supplied to the army, whose leaders have strongly supported US policies in the cold war.

25X1

*Brazil: Leftist sergeants in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo may attempt to exploit current unrest by demonstrations and other antigovernment activity during the next few days. Any move by the sergeants would receive support from the dissident, pro-Chinese Communist party (CPB)

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The government has had military units in major cities on alert since the 12 September uprising in Brasilia and is probably aware of plotting by the noncommissioned officers.

25X1

25X1

23 Sept 63

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

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